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Victor Tricot 1, Felipe Gomez Isa 2, Rick Halperin 3, Brad Klein 4
ABSTRACT
In order for a country to transform from a society in which rights were severely repressed to a society in which rights are
respected and protected, the violations of the past must be properly and adequately addressed. However, instead of using the
transition to democracy to confront the country’s history of violence and repression, the Spanish government and society actively
stifled the memory of the Civil War and forty-year dictatorship, failing to address the country’s legacy of violence and the victims
left in its wake. Despite the Spanish transition being regarded as a remarkable success story, an institutionalized historical amnesia
resulted in many oppositional counter-memories as forms of cultural resistance. This paper will demonstrate how repressing
memory left the door open for the legacy of political violence to persist in Spain.
Prioritizing processes of transitional justice and historical memory is crucial in working toward sustainable peace in Spain
and the Basque Region today. This paper will provide an overview of transitional justice and historical memory and an analysis of
the impact of Spain’s lack of transitional justice, specifically regarding the politicization of victimhood. It is important to examine
the implications of the pacto del olivido (pact of silence) and the 1977 Amnesty Law in rendering Franco’s victims invisible and
in sustaining Spain’s legacy of political violence. Furthermore, this paper will explore how the Basque terrorist group, Euskadi Ta
Askatasuna (ETA), carried on Spain’s legacy of political violence for another four decades following the end of the Franco
dictatorship. The next section of this paper will analyze how the ‘memory boom’ of the early 2000s led to greater recognition of
the victims of Francoism and to the passing of the 2007 Historical Memory Law. This analysis will show how the politicization of
victimhood resulted in an inequity between the measures taken to recognize and protect different victims’ groups, subsequently
providing more protection for victims of ETA violence. Overall, this paper contends that, in the case of Spain, a lack of transitional
justice has perpetuated a long legacy of violence and a silencing of the victims of Francoism that remain unresolved.

1.

INTRODUCTION

After traveling across Poland on a Holocaust
Remembrance Trip with Southern Methodist University’s
Human Rights Program, I spent four months researching and
writing about the legacy of the Nuremberg Trials on creating
universal human rights standards, ending cycles of impunity
through international accountability, initiating peace
processes, and documenting human rights violations on a
global scale. Transitional justice has not only been
discovered as a way to cope with the past, but also has been
found to contribute to the prevention of future violence.
When a society deals with its past by actively choosing to
remember it, the risk of violence reoccurring is lowered and
the chance of achieving sustainable peace is increased i.
Upon arriving in Spain for the semester, I learned
that the crimes of the Civil War and of Franco’s dictatorship
have never been adequately addressed. Everything I had
learned about the necessity of transitional justice was thrown

into question—I was in a country that is considered a
successful European democracy, but that has never come to
terms with its long legacy of political violence and
institutionalized repression of memory.
In 1936, Francisco Franco’s Nationalist army
initiated this legacy of violence with a coup d’état against
the democratic Second Republic, launching a bloody Civil
War that lasted for three years. After the Nationalist army
won the war, Franco ruled as dictator for forty years, heading
a regime that imprisoned, tortured, disappeared, and
murdered innocent Spaniards. Following Franco’s death in
1975, his appointed successor initiated Spain’s
democratization. While this transition period provided an
opportunity to address the crimes of the Civil War and the
dictatorship, Spanish government and society reached an
unofficial consensus, el pacto del olvido (pact of silence), to
avoid looking into the crimes of the past. This pact of silence
was institutionalized through the 1977 Amnesty Law, which
cancelled all penal responsibility for crimes during the Civil
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War and the dictatorship. Consequently, the law removed the
pathway for victims to pursue justice through a court of law
or any system of accountability.
Coming to terms with the past is never easy. But
addressing the dark parts of the past is crucial in building a
shared, peaceful future ii. Spain has never fully experienced
these processes of remembering and healing. Instead of
providing an opportunity for reconciliation, the transition
left many of the wounds of the past gaping open. It has been
said that if societies do not know their history, there remains
a danger of repeating it. Spain’s attempts to eradicate
historical memory do not make the pain and suffering of
victims disappear; instead, they create opposing narratives
about the past that make reconciliation harder and
reoccurring conflict more likely.
With a legacy of violence that was never resolved,
the young Spanish democracy entered a new period of
violence as ETA, an armed Basque separatist group, claimed
the lives of more than 800 victims over the last fifty years.
With ETA’s recent disbandment in 2018, there is a need to
address how the legacies of political violence have shaped
Spain’s current situation and what can be learned that will
be useful moving forward. “History cannot administer
justice; its moral authority comes from its regard for truth
seeking and its social utility from its power to explain and
interpret” iii. To move into a future marked by sustainable
peace, Spanish and Basque society must first fully address
the past and work to heal history’s wounds.

1.1

Research Methods and Ethics

The research for this paper consisted mainly of
qualitative data collected from over fifteen articles from
academic journals and several books written by scholars and
historians. These works make up this paper’s background
information and theoretical foundations of transitional
justice, historical memory, and the politics of victimhood. In
addition to these sources, my research drew from an
interview I conducted with Dr. Galo Bilbao, a professor of
ethics at the University of Deusto. This interview provided
further context about the current situation in the Basque
Region after the dissolution of ETA. The interview was
conducted following the School for International Training’s
Institutional Review Board’s protocol and ethical standards.

2.
2.1

ANALYSIS
Transitional Justice

After World War II, the world was confronted
with the most horrific and far-reaching crimes history had
ever seen with no model of how to deal with this level of
violence. The Allied Powers recognized that letting these
crimes go unpunished would have created a dangerous
precedent for the rest of history. Thus, the Allied Powers
launched the International Military Tribunal, known as the
Nuremberg Trials, to try 24 Nazis on counts of war crimes,
crimes against the peace, crimes against humanity, and
conspiracy to commit these crimes. These trials were the first
international criminal proceedings during which a multicountry coalition held individuals accountable for their
crimes. The Nuremberg Trials planted the seeds for an
impending global movement. In the late 1980s and early
1990s, the fall of the Soviet Union led to changes in
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governments in Latin America and Eastern Europe. As these
countries democratized and sought ways to deal with their
pasts, the transitional justice movement officially emerged.
The International Center for Transitional Justice defines
transitional justice as a “response to systematic or
widespread violations of human rights. It seeks recognition
for victims and promotion of possibilities for peace,
reconciliation and democracy. Transitional justice is not a
special form of justice, but justice adapted to societies
transforming themselves after a period of pervasive human
rights abuse. In some cases, these transformations happen
suddenly; in others, they may take place over many
decades” iv. The goals of transitional justice are to strengthen
democracy and peace after periods of mass human rights
violations; its processes are undertaken by a broad scope of
actors, including but not limited to government institutions,
individuals in positions of power and influence, and civil
society. Transitional justice is founded on the principles
established during the Nuremberg Trials: rejecting impunity;
confronting, truthfully addressing, and remembering
histories of violence and abuse; centering victims; and
valuing healing and accountability v.
While transitional justice has many advocates in
the civil and academic sectors, including “a large and diverse
community comprising legal scholars, human rights
activists, political theorists, the International Criminal Court
and non-governmental organizations such as the
International Center for Transitional Justice,” it also has
plenty of skeptics vi. Critics hold that “too much emphasis
has been placed on transitional justice as a foundation for
democratization” vii. They argue that those who advocate for
transitional justice unfairly equivocate justice and
democratization. Critics contend that advocates of
transitional justice fail to recognize that there is no one-sizefits-all model for democracy building, thus challenging
advocates’ notion that “the more comprehensive and
vigorous the effort to bring justice to a departed authoritarian
regime for its political crimes, the better the
democratization” viii. An example critics cite is the different
approaches to transition in Spain and in Portugal. Spain is
often held as a country that smoothly transitioned into a
democracy without having to dig into its past. On the other
hand, Portugal’s transition was marked by purging members
of the old regime and “dispens[ing] justice so arbitrarily and
radically that it nearly derailed the democratic transition”
and brought the nation to the brink of civil war ix. This
contrast is used to highlight that transitional justice measures
should not be hailed as a fix-all solution to a society’s
problems and that there is “no pre-ordained outcome to any
attempt at transitional justice” x.
Regardless of its critics, there are few transitional
contexts in which some element of transitional justice was
not applied. Additionally, advocates of transitional justice do
not promote it as a fix-all solution to the past because
processes of healing and remembering cannot change or
erase history for victims. However, as was first recognized
and established by the Nuremberg Trials, recognizing
victims of mass human rights abuses and trying to address
their needs is better than doing nothing. Since Nuremberg,
transitional justice has grown and transformed to include
more than solely judicial measures. The components of
transitional justice processes are truth, justice, and
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reparations, with all parts equally as important to addressing
the past and working toward healing xi. According to the
United Nations, transitional justice is “both judicial and nonjudicial including prosecution initiatives, facilitating
initiatives in respect of the right to truth, delivering
reparations,
institutional
reform
and
national
consultations” xii. By aiming to deliver on all parts,
transitional justice “can contribute to achieving the broader
objectives of prevention of further conflict, peacebuilding
and reconciliation” xiii.
Historical memory, a key component of
transitional justice processes of truth-telling, is the way in
which people construct their own narratives of the past to
make sense of what is going on in the present and to plot
their futures xiv. While it takes place within the individual, it
is “socially and politically embedded” xv. “Historical
memory is a form of social memory in which a group
constructs a selective representation of its own imagined
past” xvi. It refers “to a hidden past that is valued and rescued
before being forgotten” xvii. How societies remember events
of the past shapes how they move forward: the legacies that
are formed, the institutions that are built, the laws that are
created, the narratives that are promoted, and the people who
are remembered. “Political conflict over memory highlights
the fact that (living) memory remains under the surface of
law and sometimes becomes the object of laws” xviii.
The Spanish case presents an example of one of
the few transitional democracies that did not pursue any
processes of transitional justice. Despite a bloody Civil War
and forty-year repressive dictatorship, Spain chose not to
address its past abuse and instead actively chose to forgo an
accurate retelling of history. “Any society trying to transition
from a history of violence to a future of peace struggles with
reconciling the divisiveness of its violent legacy with the
necessary cohesion and inclusiveness needed to build a
peaceful future. The fields of historical reconciliation and
transitional justice focus on the nexus where past traumas
claw at the nascent reconstruction of politics and society.
Both fields are concerned with at least two core questions.
First, in order to constructively move into the future, to what
extent must a society deal with its past? Second, how should
a society in the pursuit of peace heed its past?” xix. In order
to analyze how the lack of transitional justice has impacted
Spain, it is important to first address the facts and to
understand the extent of its history of violence.

2.2

Background: Civil War & Franco

Between 1936-1975, there were two distinct
periods of human rights abuses in Spain: the atrocities
committed during the Civil War (1936-1939) and the Franco
regime’s revenge against Republican supporters and the
repression of regional minorities (1939-1975) xx. In 1936,
General Franco and his Nationalist army staged a coup d’état
against a “legitimate, democratically elected government,”
the Second Republic of Spain xxi. While the Civil War’s exact
death count is still unknown, the human cost has been
estimated to be somewhere between 500,000 and 600,000
lives. This estimate has the potential to grow upon further
discovery of the bodies of people who disappeared.
Following the war, “Franco’s government
promoted its own version of historical memory during its
first decade in power and promoted it without
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ambivalence” xxii. Franco rewrote the narrative of his
regime’s coup d’état against the legitimate Republican
government, portraying the Nationalist Civil War victory as
“a successful crusade against godless communism” xxiii. The
regime only recognized the Nationalist side’s victims,
granting them martyrdom and honor. “The legitimacy of
Franco’s regime after the Civil War was partly based on the
memory of the nationalists’ victims…The aim was to
preserve the memory of ‘his’ victims and to eliminate
[opponents]” xxiv. This inaccurate version of historical
memory worked to validate Franco’s narrative of history,
which he used to justify his regime’s repression and
violence. Franco’s Civil War “victory [w]as contingent:
without continued vigilance (that is, elimination of all
opposition by whatever merciless means)…triumph would
be threatened” xxv. “For the victors, the war was to be
memorialized and commemorated as a necessary Nationalist
war to save Christian Spain. For the defeated, the war
continued, experienced as their ongoing repression as the
enemy as well as a silenced personal traumatic memory” xxvi.
Franco’s manipulation of the Spanish people’s memory of
their own history warped their understanding of victimhood,
painting the Nationalists as the rightful heroic victims and
the Republicans as wrong and deserving of violence.
Franco’s dictatorship can be broken down into two
phases: the immediate post-war period (1939-1947), which
was marked by the most brutal crimes, and a stabilizing
period (1947-1975), when the regime began to move away
from fascism and toward economic stability in order to gain
greater acceptance by Western powers such as the United
States (while still maintaining an authoritarian and
repressive regime) xxvii. In the first half of the 1940s, the
prison population was over 300,000 xxviii. More than one
million people were sentenced by Franco’s War Councils
and military tribunals—most were sentenced to death or
lifetime prison sentences just for being Republican
supporters during the war xxix. Significant numbers of
children born to women in prison were systematically taken
by the government and adopted out to the families of
Franco’s supporters. In 1944, the Ministry of Justice stated
that over 190,000 prisoners had been executed or had died in
prison xxx. Tens of thousands of people were stripped of their
jobs and professional titles, 500,000 Spaniards were forced
into exile, and citizens were beaten, imprisoned, tortured,
and executed daily. The regional communities faced
Franco’s fiercest repressive policies. The Basque and
Catalan regions were prohibited from speaking their regional
languages and thousands of Basques and Catalans were
imprisoned, tortured, and executed for speaking their
languages or practicing their cultures. The complicity of
ordinary people and of the Catholic Church in supporting
and collaborating with the regime allowed Franco to stay in
power. Although the second phase of Franco’s dictatorship
saw a shift away from fascism, the repressive authoritarian
nature of his regime persisted. This period’s injustices
“consisted of sentencing people for political reasons and an
extended use of torture against the enemies of the
regime” xxxi. Additionally, his regime continued to use
military tribunals and War Councils to hand out unjust
sentences to their opponents. As a result of the lack of a truth
commission or any official fact-finding body, the extent of
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the violence and repression of both the Civil War and the
dictatorship is still being uncovered today.

2.3

Pact of Silence

Following Franco’s death, his appointed successor
led Spain into a period of democratization. Spain is one of
the few transitional contexts in which no attempts at truth,
justice, or reparations were made by the government upon
democratization. In fact, in the Spanish context, quite the
opposite occurred: the new Spanish system was “predicated
upon the ‘social contract’ of the burial of the past—no
reopening of old wounds and no questions asked” xxxii.
Spain’s “political transition did not come from a break with
the past but rather from a transfer of power that was accepted
by the former autocracies…[and] from an agreement made
between them and the emerging democratic forces” xxxiii.
This social contract, el pacto del olvido, was not just a
passive process of forgetting the atrocities of the Civil War
and Franco’s forty-year dictatorship, but “an active process
of deliberately ignoring events that were remembered only
too well” xxxiv. “In keeping with the desire to forget and move
on, the only acknowledgement of Franco’s political crimes
consisted of restoring the pensions of Republican Civil War
veterans and reinstatement of civil servants dismissed from
their jobs under Franco for political reasons. There would be
no official recognition of the killings of the Civil War,
especially from the Nationalist side headed by Franco, which
committed the bulk of them, nor of the large-scale repression
of dissidents and regional nationalists that lasted until the
final days of the dictatorship. Nor would the leadership of
the Catholic Church, the media, and the business community
be called to answer for their overt collaboration with the
Franco regime” xxxv.
Spain had no trials, no bureaucratic purges, no
reparations, no truth commissions, no reports on the crimes
and human rights violations, and not even an apology or a
recognition of the suffering caused by the nation’s long
legacy of political violence and repression. And in 1977, the
pact of silence was institutionalized and legally codified with
the 1977 Amnesty Law which succeeded in permanently
canceling the legal and political consequences of the Civil
War and Franco’s regime xxxvi. The law “encompassed acts
of political violence committed during the civil war and the
forty-year [Franco] dictatorship that followed. The law
included both those victimized by [Francoist] repression and
the agents of that repression, a concession to the right that
reflected the balance of political forces at the time” xxxvii. Not
only did the 1977 Amnesty Law conceal past crimes, it
quarantined past memory, allowed for the normalization of
the country’s legacy of violence, and marginalized Franco’s
victims xxxviii. Instead of addressing the past, “Spain chose
amnesty and a kind of institutionalized amnesia” xxxix. The
1977 Amnesty Law is still in place today.
The pact of silence and the Amnesty Law were
decided upon with a great degree of political and social
consensus as the path “to forgive the mistakes of the past and
to build a future based on reconciliation” xl. The broad
consensus on passing the Amnesty Law came to fruition for
several reasons xli. Firstly, despite the active choice not to
discuss the horrors of the Civil War or to enforce
accountability for the violence committed on both sides, the
instability that led to the Civil War had not been forgotten.
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“The democratic opposition to the Franco regime both inside
and outside of Spain was keenly aware that the political
misfortunes of the past, especially the democratic
breakdown of the interwar years, were rooted in too much
political polarization and too little willingness to
compromise” xlii. Peace and stability were extremely tenuous
during Spain’s transition to democracy, and many feared that
bringing up the grievances of the past would reignite
political tensions between those who had been (and still
were) Franco supporters and the rest of Spanish society.
The second reason the Amnesty Law was passed
was the weakness of democratic forces during the transition
that allowed much of the power to remain in the hands of the
Franco regime’s descendants. “The transition was basically
organized by the Francoist institutions themselves, without
any break in the continuity of the laws established by
Franco” xliii. In another form of Franco’s manipulation of the
historical narrative of the Civil War, his former officials
spread the lie that the atrocities committed by Nationalists
and Republicans during the Civil War were on the same
scale. This lie was legally codified in the 1977 Amnesty
Law, which “re-coded Civil War memory by creating
symmetry between the victors and vanquished as victims.
Both sides were now blamed for causing the fratricidal war
and both had suffered” xliv. As a result, the false version of
memory that Franco used to justify his repressive policies
was perpetuated after his death. “[A]chieving vindication
and justice for victims of the past were seen as less urgent
than strengthening a political alternative for the future. Since
both sides in the Civil War were responsible for committing
atrocities, they concluded nothing would be won by digging
up the past other than bringing old family demons to life” xlv.
Lastly, although many have hailed Spain as a
successful and peaceful democratization, during this time
there was a steep increase in terrorist violence that originated
in the Basque Region and was led by Euskadi Ta
Askatasuna. By some accounts, during the transition period
773 people were killed by groups from the extreme right,
left, or ETA between 1972 and 1982, and 450 of these
victims were killed in the Basque Region xlvi. “This fear of
conflict, combined with the uncertainty of the political
situation during transition, and the central role played by
moderate elites (reformists from within the Franco regime
and the moderate democratic opposition, between whom the
features of the new system were negotiated), contributed to
a climate of risk-aversion. The presence of extremist forces
(ETA and right-wing groups) engaging in political violence
and seeking to undermine negotiated change also reinforced
the overriding emphasis in the mainstream on consensus and
reconciliation” xlvii.
The fear of Francoist political elites was that a
look into the past would reveal the truth about their own
roles in supporting the violence and repression of the Franco
regime. The fear of Spanish society and Franco’s opposition
was that pursuing any processes of transitional justice would
destabilize the new democracy and cause a second Civil War
xlviii. Thus, all sides agreed that looking to the future by
avoiding the past was the only way “to ensure, at long last, a
peaceful transition toward democracy” xlix. However, as this
paper will explore, the pact of silence and 1977 Amnesty
Law denied Franco’s victims and future generations of Spain
the truth about their history. “Denying the validity of
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memory as a source of fact attempts to keep these terrible
crimes from public knowledge” l.

2.4

Legacy of Violence

In political contexts where histories of violence
are treated with impunity and an absence of accountability,
that legacy of violence continues into the future. As violence
goes unaddressed and forgotten, “new cycles of impunity”
may ensue and create the conditions for “those previously
victimized [to] use the past and their analysis of it to argue
for their legitimacy as victims while at the same time
justifying action which do violence to others” li. This pattern
of violence and subsequent victimhood was borne out by
Franco’s narrative of Nationalist victimhood used to
perpetrate crimes against his opponents and Spain’s regional
communities, creating another class of victims, some of
whom would go on to carry out more violence and bloodshed
in the post-Franco era.
By failing to engage with the past, Spain’s
transition “reveal[s] the incapacity of the Spanish democracy
to break with the ingrained interests and values inherited
from Francoism which were incorporated into the political
culture of the country” lii. The pact of silence and political
arrangement that left many of the Francoist institutions still
intact “exacerbated the opposition of those who had held out
for more” liii. “This decision to ‘forget,’ then, was shaped and
reinforced by dominant political and cultural discourses in a
way that continued to marginalize, or indeed actively
suppress, the stories and memories of those on the losing
side in the civil war, even after the transition was
complete” liv. Even after the war was long over and the
dictatorship had ended, the victims of Franco were the
victims of a movement working to forget and silence their
pain. The failure of the Spanish government to integrate any
processes of transitional justice, and in fact to actively stifle
the memory of the victims and the violence they endured,
allowed the legacy of violence perpetuated by the Franco
regime to live on in the new democracy. The absence of
transitional justice rendered sustainable peace less likely and
helped victims justify their own acts of violence.

2.5

ETA

The remainder of this paper will focus on how the
lack of transitional justice affected the Basque region and
Spain’s legacy of violence that has persisted for decades.
“Victims of state-sponsored terrorism [were] often Basque
nationalists. Thus, many in this victim community trace their
victimization to the oppressive policies of Franco’s
authoritarian regime, feeding the argument that current state
violence simply continues long-standing policies of state
repression. In truth, the conflict between ETA and the
Spanish state began during Franco’s authoritarian regime.
ETA first emerged in 1958 as a political group focused on
propaganda that splintered the Basque Nationalist Party,
Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV). Eventually, though,
ETA became dissatisfied with the complacency of the PNV,
the lack of recognition for the Basque cause and was
radicalized by repressive state policies directed at Basque
culture and citizens under Franco” lv.
ETA, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Freedom),
is responsible for fifty years of domestic terrorism that
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resulted in the murders of 830 people, the majority carried
out after Franco’s death and the transition to democracy lvi.
In its early stages, “ETA found legitimacy for its existence,
ideology and actions in Franco’s repression of Basque
culture and identity and targeted excesses against it” lvii. It
was widely assumed that after Franco’s death and the
transition to democracy, the Basque region would no longer
be a target of repression and ETA’s advocacy for the Basque
region’s culture and language would no longer be considered
necessary and would thus naturally come to an end. Instead,
the years following Franco’s death “were the bloodiest in
ETA’s history,” and ETA’s violent opposition to the
transition almost derailed Spain’s democratization lviii. For
some, ETA’s violence might “have been understandable as a
response to Franco’s repression, [but] during the transition
to democracy” a threshold of acceptability was crossed lix.
For many, “there [was] no justification for ETA’s violence
in democratic Spain” lx.
ETA’s fifty-year existence can be broken down
into several phases. From ETA’s founding in 1959 to
Franco’s death in 1975, the group was considered to be a
legitimate resistance organization advocating for the
protections of those living in the autonomous communities,
specifically the Basque region, against a repressive and
violent dictatorship which targeted these regional
communities. For some who supported ETA’s cause, its
fight against a regime that was particularly harsh on the
Basque Country was enough to justify ETA’s violence.
ETA’s early victims were mainly members of the police and
military, and many of these victims were considered to have
died as a part of their duties and were thus largely ignored lxi.
Following the transition, from the mid-1980s until 1997,
ETA targeted and killed more widely known social and
political actors and conducted their first indiscriminate
bombings. This period saw the growing of Spanish society’s
recognition of and compassion toward victims of ETA
violence. The major turning point in public sentiment
opposing ETA followed the 1997 murder of Miguel Angel
Blanco. ETA kidnapped Blanco, a 29-year-old Partido
Popular (PP) politician, and then gave the Spanish
government the ultimatum to transfer ETA prisoners to the
Basque Country or Blanco would be killed. After the
deadline for the ultimatum had passed and was unmet, ETA
murdered the young politician. Blanco’s death launched the
turning point in Spanish society’s perception of terrorism
and its victims by “inaugurat[ing] legislative recognition of
victims of [ETA] terrorism,” leading to the creation of the
first victims organizations in Spain, and uniting the country
against ETA lxii.
This paper’s analysis of the forces that may have
helped perpetuate and sustain ETA’s violence is not a
justification for their violent crimes, the 830 lives taken, or
the many more lives changed forever. Seeking to understand
what forces prompted ETA to carry on such violence and
terror for forty years “expose[s] fissures in Spanish society
that had remained open since the transition to
democracy” lxiii. The long-term costs of the transition without
transitional justice was a lasting legacy of violence that left
the door open for ETA to continue down the unresolved and
unaddressed path of violence and destruction.
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2.6

Memory Boom

The Franco regime promoted a false narrative of
the Civil War that served as the foundation of and
justification for decades of repression and extreme violence.
Then, during the transition, Spanish society allowed their
memories of the Civil War to justify actively repressing
public discussion and collective memory of the war and the
dictatorship. Subsequently, a section of Basque society used
their memories of the Franco regime’s violence to promote
their own independence agenda and to justify their
perpetuation of the dictatorship’s legacy of violence.
Democracy has a responsibility and a “‘duty of memory’: an
obligation to remember so that history is not repeated” lxiv.
By refusing to acknowledge the power of collective memory
building, Spanish society opened the door for the
construction of competing historical narratives about
Spain’s legacies of violence.
“Franco’s victims…[had] remained invisible until
the early 2000s, while the dictatorship’s narrative of a
conflict for which both sides were to blame was not
challenged” lxv. However, with the murder of Miguel Angel
Blanco, Spanish society was finally waking up to the need to
address the nation’s victims. Following the turn of the
century, the forces of civil society pushing for a return to
memory helped shift the political balance. After the
exhumation of the unmarked grave of his grandfather,
Emilio Silva Barrera founded the Association for the
Recuperation of Historical Memory in 2000 and led civil
society’s charge in demanding truth and justice for victims
of the dictatorship. Between 2003 and 2005, the number of
victims’ organizations increased from 30 to almost 170,
“reflecting an emerging sensitivity by generational change,
new developments in international law and the increasing
predominance of victim’s advocacy” lxvi. Along with internal
political and societal forces, the transitional justice
movement had revitalized international concern over
historical memory and served to propel Spain’s ‘memory
boom’ lxvii.
It is hard to believe that there is any part of Spanish
society that refuses to accept a condemnation of a repressive
dictatorship. However, “even today, it is not unusual to come
across sweetened perceptions of Francoism: it was a period
in which, despite the lack of freedom, there was plenty of
work and the country seemed to experience a general
improvement of living standards” lxviii. But Spain’s memory
boom revealed that the political consensus of the transition
no longer existed lxix. In the early 2000s, the left-leaning
parties and other parties that were historically opposed to the
dictatorship finally called for a review of the past to correct
the deficiencies of the transition. On the right, Partido
Popular (PP) refused to go back to criticize the Franco
regime lxx. However, as civil society’s pushes for political
change began to gain momentum, the Socialist Party (PSOE)
won a majority for the first time in 2004 and intensified the
calls for a return to memory lxxi. The PSOE began “attacking
the PP where it was most vulnerable…and depicted the right
as the enemy of ‘historical memory’” lxxii. The combination
of the calls from civil society and the PSOE’s rise to power
finally put historical memory of the Civil War, dictatorship,
and transition on the political agenda. PSOE deemed the
2006 the “Year of Historical Memory,” and made the first
serious efforts by the Spanish government to rectify Franco’s
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narrative of history and to commemorate the dictatorship’s
silenced victims.
As a result of the memory wars between the
political left and right, consensus on legislation to legally
codify these memorialization efforts was hard to reach lxxiii.
However, in 2007, over thirty years after Franco’s death and
the beginning of the transition to democracy, the Spanish
Parliament passed the Law of Historical Memory. The law
“recognizes the individual ‘right to memory’; it denies the
legitimacy of the Francoist courts that violated fundamental
rights, therefore repealing the validity of their norms and
resolutions; it offers economic support for those excluded
from former compensation programs; and it sets a series of
rules both for the exhumation of mass graves and for the
eradication of every form of apology of the Civil War and
the dictatorship from the public space” lxxiv. The most
symbolically profound element of the 2007 Law of
Historical Memory is that this law marked the first time
Spanish law formally acknowledged the crimes and human
rights violations committed under the dictatorship. This law
finally classifies the Franco regime as illegitimate and breaks
the hold of the pact of silence. Following the lead of
international transitional justice movements, the “[l]aw
represents the victim-centered choice of transitional justice
by examining past violence through the experience of
victims rather than through the crimes of perpetrators” lxxv.
Despite the victory of the law’s “symbolic effect
and its open-ended status which does not close the door on
future transitional justice measures,” the Historical Memory
Law has many critics lxxvi. While the law officially ended the
pact of silence, it failed to end the cycle of impunity
protected by the 1977 Amnesty Law, revealing the persistent
lack of political consensus to hold perpetrators accountable.
The Historical Memory Law also failed to adequately
address truth-telling transitional justice processes. The law
guarantees each individual’s right to remember the past in
their own way, but it is “not accompanied by public policies
that ensure effective implementation” lxxvii. The law could
have followed the example of South Africa post-apartheid,
when the government established the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission “which granted amnesty to the
old regime in exchange for confessing to its political
sins” lxxviii. It created no such truth commission or any
official, government-led fact-finding body. Lastly, the law
has been largely criticized for failing to overturn the
thousands of politically motivated sentences issued by
Franco’s War Councils and military tribunals lxxix. While “it
re-coded the Civil War memory by revealing the number of
unrecognized victims and the institutional responsibilities
for human rights violations[,]…the Law recognized victims’
rights more than it created victims’ rights” lxxx.
Truth, justice, and reparations—none can be
isolated from the other in transitional justice processes.
While the 2007 Historical Memory Law made a stride in the
right direction toward reclaiming an accurate historical
memory, its efforts were not exhaustive. The “law will
probably never lay completely to rest the profound
disagreements—over national history and identity and the
claims of memory, both individual and ‘collective’—that
have preoccupied” Spain since Franco’s death lxxxi. The
passage of the Historical Memory Law began important
work in recognizing Franco’s victims and reclaiming truth
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from the regime’s warped and manipulated narrative of
history, but the law cannot be the end of this story. “A
standard to evaluate the dignity of society is the way in
which it treats its victims. This is how the demands for
justice and symbolic restoration have entered the dimension
of ‘historical memory’” lxxxii.

2.7

Victimhood

While transitional justice is intended to be victimcentered, its models run the risk of taking for granted who
the victims are. “Identifying victims is not always as
straightforward as it may seem, and much is at stake.
Transitional justice measures, especially reparations
programs, need to identify who the victims are, which may
politicize them” lxxxiii. In the Spanish context, defining
victimhood is extremely controversial. “The figure of the
victim is mobilized almost universally in Spain…for politics
in Spain presents itself as an imagined dispute among
victims” lxxxiv.
Victimhood can be defined as “the identity,
meaning and status of victims in society…[but it] is not
given. Rather, it is historically and socially constructed,
which of course does not mean that victims’ suffering is not
‘real.’ [It] is simply that the [legal] status of victims in
society is not directly related to the harm suffered” lxxxv. As
such, the legal status of victimhood becomes inevitably
entangled in politics. This may lead to “contests over the
identity, meaning and status of victims in society beyond the
victim-perpetrator continuum in relation to a specific
episode of violence” as can be seen in the context of the
memory wars between Spain’s political left and right, both
sides claiming opposing groups of victims and thus
politicizing them lxxxvi. While the different forms of
victimization are “impossible to measure, classify, or
quantify,” “how the victim is constructed shapes the way
justice, moral community and state legitimacy are
configured” and how history is remembered lxxxvii, lxxxviii.

2.8

Interview: Dr. Galo Bilbao lxxxix

As a part of my research, I interviewed Dr. Galo
Bilbao about his work with victims of terrorism in the
Basque Region. Dr. Bilbao specializes in the field of ethics,
and much of his life’s work has focused on the best ways to
approach victims and questions of victimhood in the Spanish
context. He has collaborated on and led several initiatives in
his field, such as bringing together different victims’ groups
to work toward building mutual understanding, introducing
victims’ stories inside Spanish classrooms, and bringing
together ETA victims with ex-ETA members to create space
for reconciliation, healing, and peace.
My conversation with Dr. Bilbao makes up an
important component of my research. Our interview was
conducted in Spanish and translated by SIT’s academic
director, Dr. Victor Tricot. As someone who has worked
directly with victims and perpetrators of violence in the
Basque Region, Dr. Bilbao has a very important perspective.
Although some of Dr. Bilbao’s opinions differ from the other
scholars I cite in this paper, his insight on the topic of the
politicization of victimhood in the context of Spain and in
the specific context of the Basque Country is valuable.
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2.9

Counterpoint: No Continuity

One of Dr. Bilbao’s main assertions—and
counterpoints to my argument in this paper—is that he
believes there cannot be an established continuity between
the Civil War, Franco dictatorship, and ETA’s violence. In
his opinion, to say that one period of violence led to another
and could possibly explain ETA’s violence runs the risk of
justifying ETA’s use of violence in the newly democratic
Spain. Furthermore, ETA activity was much more violent in
the period of democracy than during the dictatorship. In our
interview, Dr. Bilbao expressed the importance of not using
the flaws of the transition as an excuse or legitimization of
ETA’s violence.
As was raised by Dr. Bilbao in our interview, it is
important to reiterate that this research is not an attempt to
justify or legitimize any form of violence. This paper’s
argument is not that there is a clear and direct link leading
from the Civil War to Franco’s regime, from the dictatorship
to the lack of transitional justice during the transition, and
then the failings of the transition to the violence of ETA.
Spain’s history, like all history, is extremely complex and
nuanced. In this case, to assert finite causation is not only a
logical fallacy but an extremely oversimplified version of
history and of memory. Like Dr. Bilbao said, everybody
constructs their own memory about how history happened,
and we have to be able to coexist with these different stories,
even if they are contradictory. Memory, even historical
memory, is living. The argument of this paper, however, is
that there is a legacy of violence stemming from the Franco
regime’s violent repression of memory which left the
resulting counter-narratives of different victims’ groups
unaddressed, forgotten, and stifled, contributing to
continued cycles of violence and impunity.

2.10

Victims of Terrorism

Dr. Bilbao and I did agree that when looking at the
treatment of Franco’s victims and of victims of ETA
terrorism, important parallels and distinctions in their
treatment and politicization can be made. When discussing
victims of terrorism, Dr. Bilbao spent much time discussing
the breakdown of victims. He said that the Law for Victims
of Terrorism, and the majority of society’s focus, centers on
victims of ETA violence. He said that many of the victims
who are often forgotten or overlooked are the victims of
government-sanctioned, extreme-right groups such as
Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (GAL) and the victims
of police abuse—those who were tortured or murdered while
in custody. To him, while these are distinct types of
terrorism, all three groups are victims of terrorism, and he
believes that all groups should have a law that protects and
recognizes their victimhood. Due to the scope of this
research, my interview with Dr. Bilbao focused on two
victims’ groups—victims of Franco and victims of terrorism
(mainly victims of ETA violence). This is not to diminish or
devalue the plight of other victims’ groups in Spain.
Dr. Bilbao believes that civil society is far
removed from the concerns and plight of the different
victims’ groups. As for the sentiment of Spanish society
toward the victims of the Franco regime, many Spaniards
believe that the concerns of Franco’s victims are the
problems “of our grandparents” and feel that the issue should
not be a priority xc. For the victims of terrorism, there were
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around 1,100 total victims over ETA’s fifty years of
violence. While ETA was committing violence as late as
2011 and their mark is still fresh on Spanish society, since
ETA’s violent campaign was stretched out over five
decades, many Spaniards were largely left unaffected by
terrorism which allowed them to continue to live their
normal lives xci. This apathy results in victims’ groups
maintaining their own causes, continually representing the
roles of victims (even if they have overcome that role), and
reliving their pain in order to have their voices heard. As Dr.
Bilbao so aptly described it, society turns its back on victims
because the “presence of victims reminds us that things are
not as good as we think they are. That our transition was not
as good as we thought. And that our response to ETA and
terrorism was also not as good as we thought” xcii.

2.11

Inconsistent Treatment of Victims

Victims of terrorism have seen a much more
expedient and forceful reaction by Spanish government and
society. The aftermath of Blanco’s murder in 1997 led to the
first law to “recognize and provide protection to victims of
terrorism” in 1999 xciii. The Spanish Parliament passed the
Act on Solidarity with the Victims of Terrorism which
“established a system of compensation that would
completely cover the question of civil liability, providing a
compensation to both the direct and indirect victims of
terrorism” xciv. The measures outlined by this law “cover[ed]
such concepts as expenses for psychological help and also
recognized other rights in different orders, such as those
concerning enrolment at state schools. The protection
afforded by the Act covered all terrorist acts committed since
1968, when ETA made its first fatal attack” xcv. In 2000,
PSOE and PP signed an agreement known as “the Pact for
Liberties and against Terrorism” which outlines the
government’s priority to “grant [victims of terrorism] the
recognition and the attention of Spanish society…to
preserve their memory, to establish a system of daily and
permanent assistance” xcvi. In 2011, Congress adopted the
Act on the Recognition and Comprehensive Protection of
Victims of Terrorism which “strengthens the existing regime
and adds several new rights” xcvii. “The new Act expressly
recognized all of the victims of terrorism as victims of
abuses of human rights. Additionally, the political
significance of the victims of terrorism was explicitly
recognized in the preliminary recitals” xcviii. The 2011 Act for
victims of terrorism “proclaimed the rights to memory,
dignity, justice and truth, requiring the institutions to take
appropriate action to discover the truth and the real causes of
victimization, thus contributing to a narrative that avoided
any neutrality, ambiguity and/or moral and political
equidistance between victims and terrorists” xcix.
Additionally, some of Spain’s autonomous regions have
developed initiatives to recognize and provide reparation to
victims of terrorism. In 2011, the Basque Parliament adopted
a Declaration “relating to the victims of violations of human
rights other unjust causes of suffering produced in a context
of politically motivated violence” c. In 2012, the Basque
Government expanded on these provisions through a decree
“which highlighted the need to put an end to the institutional
oblivion suffered by these victims and accepted that the
victims of terrorism could be deemed victims of violations
of human rights” ci.
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Despite the need to recognize all victims equally,
Franco’s victims often hold that they are “‘second-class
victims’” and point to the inadequacies of the 2007 Law of
Historical Memory Law as their proof cii. The law’s official
name is the “‘Law to Recognize and Broaden Rights and to
Establish Measures in Favor of Those Who Suffered
Persecution or Violence during the Civil War and the
Dictatorship’” ciii. Along with the inadequacies analyzed
earlier in this paper, a notable addition is that the Historical
Memory Law does not grant Franco’s victims the legal status
of victim. In fact, the law does not even use the term
‘victims,’ only referring to “‘those who suffered the
consequences of the Civil War and of the dictatorship,’” thus
emphasizing the refusal to recognize them not as actual
victims, but as past damages civ. “This contrasts greatly with
other laws which repeatedly use this concept, above all the
Act 29/2011 on recognition and full protection of the victims
of terrorism” cv. Franco’s victims argue that, compared to the
rights and reparations measures granted to victims of
terrorism outlined above, especially victims of ETA’s
violence, the 2007 Law grants far fewer rights and
reparations of a much more limited scope cvi. Many argue that
the 2007 Historical Memory Law creates two classes of
victims of human rights violations in Spain: the more
recognized victims of terrorism championed by the political
right, and the second-class victims of Franco’s regime cvii.
The first law for the victims of terrorism was
passed in 1999, thirty-one years after ETA’s first fatal attack.
The Historical Memory Law was passed in 2007, over
seventy years after the legacy of violence began in 1936.
After comparing the measures the Spanish government has
passed for victims of terrorism to those supporting Franco’s
victims, it is pervasive that the treatment of these two groups
has not been equal. However, as this research outlined, many
of ETA’s early victims, especially members of the military
and the police force, are not recognized or honored as fully
as are the later victims of ETA terrorism. This assertion,
combined with Dr. Bilbao’s explanation of the complex
layers of Spanish victimhood, reveals the unfairness in
Spain’s recognition of nearly all victims’ groups. This
inequality stems from the politicization of victims that
political parties capitalize on to win votes or to push their
agendas. If the inconsistent treatment of victims is not
addressed, Spain’s potential to move toward a sustainably
peaceful future will be held back.

3.

CONCLUSION
The active choice to address victims’ issues and to
rectify the inconsistent treatment of victims’ groups will be
crucial in making any further progress in transitional justice,
historical memory, reconciliation, and sustainable peace in
Spain. This paper began by introducing the idea of
transitional justice and establishing its importance in
countries emerging from periods of human rights abuse and
violent conflict. While transitional justice cannot guarantee
or inevitably cause certain outcomes such as lasting peace,
history has shown that taking measures to recognize, respect,
remember, and honor victims is often an essential step in
recovering from past violence. After providing an overview
of Spain’s long legacy of violence beginning with the Civil
War and Francisco Franco’s forty-year dictatorship, this
paper examined how Spain actively chose to bypass an
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opportunity to implement measures of transitional justice
during its transition to democracy. Instead of pursuing truth,
justice, and reparations, political pressure resulted in a pact
of silence between the new government and Spanish society.
Consequently, the perpetrators of the past were protected
under the 1977 Amnesty Law and the victims of Francoism
were forgotten and silenced. This paper argued that while
there is no identifiable, direct link between Spain’s histories
of violence that in any way justifies them, the lack of
transitional justice during the transition allowed the legacy
of violence of the Civil War and of Franco’s regime to live
on unaddressed and protected in the new democracy.
Subsequently, for the next forty years, this legacy of
violence was carried on through ETA terrorism. Over the last
century, Spain’s institutionalized unaddressed history of
violence has left scores of victims, many silenced and
forgotten. This paper goes on to establish the inadequacies
of the 2007 Historical Memory Law in addressing the needs
of Franco’s victims, even to go so far as to deny them the
legal status of victimhood. Meanwhile, the multiple laws
passed by the Spanish Parliament for victims of terrorism
recognize this group of victims as more deserving of
recognition and of rights. The politicization of victimhood
resulted in laws that treat and classify victims’ groups
differently, creating a cleavage of inequity between them,
deepening division and making reconciliation between them
more difficult. While seemingly disconnected and unrelated,
these differences launch the victims of Francoism
“implicitly…into an imagined dialogue with the victims of
ETA” cviii.
History cannot be understood in isolation. “When
we talk about historical memory our view goes back to 1936
and the start of Francoism. That is where we begin the
narrative” cix. To deny that there is a legacy of violence in
Spain is to once again repress the memory of the violence of
the Civil War, the Franco regime, and ETA. This denial
perpetuates the repression so many victims have
experienced. The 2018 disbanding of ETA presents Spain’s
government and society with a unique opportunity to turn a
new page for all victims. “Sustainable peace requires ending
the cycle of impunity as well as building an inclusive
political community and governance framework. At this
propitious moment, Basque society and the Spanish state are
again on the verge of entering a new peaceful era” cx.
“[A] careful consideration of Spain’s history of
violence over the last eighty years and the competing
analyses of it actually demonstrates that, if unreconciled
with its past, new cycles of impunity will ensue. In these
cycles, in each new political context, those previously
victimized use the past and their analysis of it to argue for
their legitimacy as victims while at the same time justifying
actions which do violence to others, in turn creating more
victims and more deeply entrenched victims’ communities.
Thus, contrary to conventional thinking, reconciliation in
Spain and the Basque country will need to address the fact
that victims of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) violence and
victims of state counterterrorism methods have constructed
competing historical narratives about their shared legacies of
violence. In other words, it will be important for Spain to
find ways to fit the objective truths of human rights
violations into the more complex and subjective dynamics
by which victims are also perpetrators” cxi. In order to
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continue to pursue sustainable peaceful relations, there needs
to be an understanding of how Spain’s recent history and its
resulting conflicting victims’ narratives about the legacies of
violence have shaped the Spain of today. Not just for ETA’s
victims, but for the victims of Francoism, state terrorism,
police abuse, and all mass violence.
The future of Spain relies on the country’s ability
to remember and honestly address its past. On Sunday, April
28th, 2019, Spain lost its status as the last major European
country without a significant far-right presence in its
national government. The far-right, anti-feminist, and antiimmigrant Vox party earned 10% of the vote in the national
elections and earned twenty-four seats in the Spanish
Parliament. Although the PSOE remains in the significant
majority, these elections mark a partial return to and embrace
of Spain’s divisive, fascist past. “The past hasn’t lost…it’s
just been forgotten” cxii.
In the ninth grade, I read Night by professor,
political activist, Nobel Laureate, and Holocaust survivor,
Elie Wiesel. His book set me on the path to become a Human
Rights major, to become passionate about the transitional
justice movement, and to conduct this research. Although he
primarily writes of his experience as a Holocaust survivor,
the lessons we can learn from Elie Wiesel apply to larger
contexts and themes of human dignity and peace. I think it
is fitting to end my research with an excerpt from Elie
Wiesel’s Nobel Prize lecture cxiii:
Of course, we could try to forget the past. Why
not? Is it not natural for a human being to repress what
causes him pain, what causes him shame? Like the body,
memory protects its wounds. When day breaks after a
sleepless night, one’s ghosts must withdraw; the dead are
ordered back to their graves. But for the first time in history,
we could not bury our dead. We bear their graves within
ourselves.
For us, forgetting was never an option.
Remembering is a noble and necessary act. The call of
memory, the call to memory, reaches from the very dawn of
history…It is incumbent upon us to remember the good we
have received, and the evil we have suffered.
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